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DATA FIRST – TAX NEXT:
HOW FIJI’S TECHNOLOGY CAN IMPROVE NEW ZEALAND’S “NETFLIX TAX” (Part 4)
Richard T. Ainsworth
This is the fourth paper examining the recent amendments to the New Zealand Goods and
Services Tax (GST); amendments that are collectively known as the Netflix Tax. These papers
assess the effectiveness of the Netflix provisions, and how they could be enhanced if New
Zealand adopted the technology and vision of Fiji’s VAT Monitoring System (VMS). The
Netflix provisions were effective, July 1, 2017.
This final paper considers: (a) the treatment of domestic agents when they are used by
remote service providers to facilitate sales to New Zealand customers;1 (b) how New Zealand
intends to respond to resident consumers who supply false information to remote service
providers in an effort to induce those providers into improperly zero-rate transactions, and
thereby defeat the GST;2 and (c) the treatment of dual status taxpayers, New Zealand residents
whose status allows them to enter into contracts with remote service providers either as
individual consumers or as business taxpayers. 3
As before, the primary contrast is the difference between New Zealand’s traditional
(statute and regulation) approach to VAT reform, and the technology-intensive approach of Fiji.
Both jurisdictions are struggling to deal with the modern economy, but they approach this
challenge very differently. These papers come down on the side of Fiji and technology. In the
end they observe that what Fiji understands is that code, computer code, is a very effective, costefficient, and self-enforcing form of regulation. There is something important to learn about the
way that Fiji utilizes “code” in its tax reform. 4
DOMESTIC AGENTS
In a very real sense, the domestic agent rules on remotely supplied services (NZ GSTA
§§ 60(1A) and 60(1AB)) are drafted as companions to the more complex electronic marketplace
rules considered earlier.5 In the electronic marketplace context both the remote seller and the
agent (the electronic marketplace) are non-residents. This creates considerable complexity as
well as opportunity for upstream and downstream frauds.
Both the complexity and the opportunity for fraud are greatly reduced in the domestic
agent context. A domestic agent is a resident, someone who is (most likely) already registered
for GST, without consideration of the agency relationship. The domestic element also makes

NZ GSTA §§60(1A) & 60(1AB)
NZ GSTA §§5(27) & 51B(7).
3 NZ GSTA §§8(4B); 20(4D); 20(3JC) & 25AA.
4 Lawrence Lessig, Code Is Law – On Liberty and Cyberspace, HARVARD MAGAZINE (January-February 2000)
5 NZ GSTA §§60C; 60D; 60D(3); & 60(1C), and Richard T. Ainsworth & Chang Che, Data First – Tax Next:
How Fiji’s Technology Can Improve New Zealand’s “Netflix Tax” (Part 3) (Electronic Marketplaces) XX TAX
NOTES INTERNATIONAL XX (2019)
1
2
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some things much simpler.6 A domestic agent, unlike an electronic marketplace, is fully under
New Zealand’s jurisdictional oversight.
Nevertheless, some of the same compliance problems that plague electronic marketplaces
are present in a domestic agent fact pattern, along with some new problems inherent in the
differences among the types of domestic agents. There are captive (dependent) agents and
independent agents. The rules at §§ 60(1A) and 60(1AB) deal with both.7
NZ GSTA §60(1AB) authorizes remote suppliers and their domestic agents to agree that
the agent (not the principal) is the party making the supply. This requires the agent, if its sales
exceed the NZ$60,000 threshold, to register, collect, and remit the GST. 8 B2B and B2C sales
automatically count against the filing threshold of a New Zealand resident. In an electronic
marketplace context, a non-resident will always be considered the taxpayer making the supply.
In a domestic agent context, it is the resident agent who will most commonly be the taxpayer, and
only occasionally will the non-resident principal be responsible for collecting, reporting and
remitting the GST. This shifting responsibility is controlled by §60(1AB).
The NZ GSTA §60(1AB) agreement is critical to understanding resident agents and how
they satisfy GST compliance obligations. There are a number of notable elements to the
§60(1AB) agreement:
• First, the agreement is a one-way election. The agreement will make the resident agent
the taxpayer. The §60(1AB) agreement functions like similar electronic marketplace
rules at §§2, 60D, 60C, and 60(1C). These provisions modify the “main rule” in §60(1).
It is the “main rule” that makes the principal the taxpayer;
• Second, the statute does not contemplate an agreement which would have both parties
share GST liability on the same transaction. There is only one taxpayer responsible for
GST;
• Third, the agreement may be transactional, or granular. That is, the agreement can shift
liability back and forth between agent and principal depending on the “particular supply,
or a type of supply.” In other words, the §60(1AB) agreement is not an all or nothing
entity-based agreement; it is highly flexible and granular. Details are very important,
because if multiple supplies are made between the same parties the GST obligations are
not necessarily satisfied in the same manner §60(1B);

Part of the simplification comes from avoiding the threshold issues discussed in Richard T. Ainsworth, Data First
– Tax Next: How Fiji’s Technology Can Improve New Zealand’s “Netflix Tax” (Part 2) 94 TAX NOTES
INTERNATIONAL 319, 320-321 (April 18, 2019). See figure 1.
7 Borrowing terminology from the insurance sector, an independent insurance agent (independent agencies) offers
products from numerous insurance companies. They enter into contracts that gives them binding authority to sell on
behalf of their principals. They get leads on their own and represent the customer buying the insurance.
Independent agents (agencies) work on a commission basis, plus a bonus. Captive insurance agents (captive
agencies, or dependent agents) work for one specific company. The individual agents work out of an office in the
corporate headquarters, or a sales office within a geographic area where the company does business. The agents get
leads from the company and represent the product the company sells. The individual agents are employees,
compensated with a salary and commission.
8 The statute is very direct. NZ GST §60(1AB) reads:
The principal and the agent may agree that the agent, and not the principal, is treated as making the
supply in the course and furtherance of a taxable activity carried on by them.
6
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•

Fourth, the agreement is closed. It is only between the agent and principal and does not
involve either the customer (who will pay the GST) or the tax authority (that will audit
compliance). The interplay between the third and fourth element is particularly troubling
from an audit perspective. It is not possible to determine the proper GST treatment from
a distance as the granularity (third element) is embedded in the closed agreement (fourth
element).

The essential problem created by the §60(1AB) agreement is that it produces a real-time
information asymmetry – that is, the supplier and agent (who may be related parties) immediately
know the tax impact of their §60(1AB) agreement. However, neither the domestic buyer nor the
tax authority share in this information in real-time. The domestic buyer may never know if the
invoice it received was accurate. The buyer certainly has no way to immediately know upon
receipt of the invoice. The tax authority may suspect that an agreement is in place, and if the
right tax was charged and collected, but it will only know for sure after a thorough audit where
the §60(1AB) agreement is read and analyzed.
The biggest question raised by a §60(1AB) agreement that a buyer or the tax authority
would want answered quickly is: Was this transaction subject to the 15% GST or should it have
been zero-rated?9 One would think that if a private party agreement was going to significantly
change the appropriate tax rate on a cross border invoice that there would be: (a) simple
notification mechanism to inform all parties concerned, and (b) a verification mechanism that the
change that occurred was correct. This would happen in Fiji;10 it could be the norm in New
Zealand, if it adopted Fiji MVS.
There are statutory hints that New Zealand recognizes that it has drafted a statute that
may be too flexible to be easily audited. 11 There are real possibilities that more than one invoice

See generally, Figure 2 in Richard T. Ainsworth, Data First – Tax Next: How Fiji’s Technology Can Improve New
Zealand’s “Netflix Tax” (Part 1) 94 TAX NOTES INTERNATIONAL 159, 168-170 (April 8, 2019). A brief summary of
the applicable rules are as follows: if a registered domestic agent makes a taxable supply to a New Zealand business
the 15% GST applies, but if a §60(1AB) agreement is not in place the same supply is deemed made by the nonresident principal, and the transaction is either not considered, or zero-rated. A non-resident supplier of remote
services is initially:
(a) Not required to return GST on supplies to New Zealand GST-registered businesses;
(b) Not required to provide tax invoices;
(c) But, may treat the supply as zero-rated (NZ GST §8(4D)), and if so
(d) May also claim back New Zealand GST cost incurred in making the zero-rated supply (NZ GST
§11A(1)(x));
(e) Which is, compounded by a rule that allows the non-resident supplier to presume that a New Zealand
customer is not a GST-registered business absent affirmative declarations by the buyer (GST registration
number, or New Zealand Business Number, or other notification mechanisms. (NZ GST §8B(5)) with
some added flexibility in (NZ GST §8B(6)) in alternate methods allowed by the Commissioner on a caseby-case basis;
(f) With complications for inadvertently charged GST and refund mechanisms; (NZ GST §§20(4C), 25(1) &
25(1)(abb)) which are further complicated by rules covering supplies of less that NZ$1,000 (NZ GST §24
(4)).
10 Fiji has made plans to adopt a Netflix Tax in 2019.
11 For example, after §60(1) identifies that the principal is normally the responsible party for issuing the tax invoice,
it steps back and adds the following conditions:
9
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could be issued for some transactions. Problems can arise from automated systems generating
invoices. If these systems are not carefully maintained and updated when new §60(1AB)
agreements are entered into mistakes will arise which may be difficult to spot by the tax
authority, and impossible to identify by a buyer who is unaware of the agreement.
One would expect fewer problems when dependent domestic agents are involved than
when independent domestic agents are used by non-resident principles. Dependent agents and
their principals are almost always related parties, and they will (probably) have a unified invoice
generating system. Nevertheless, the invoice patterns can be complex, difficult to audit, and
opaque to the domestic purchaser, who in cases of errors on invoices exceeding NZ$1,000 needs
to secure the GST refund from the counter-party, not through the mechanism of a GST refund
(NZ GST §20(4C).12 See figure 1 (below).

provided that, where that supply is a taxable supply, that agent, being a registered person, may,
notwithstanding anything in this Act, issue a tax invoice or a credit note or a debit note in relation
to that supply as if that agent had made a taxable supply, and to the extent that that tax invoice or
credit note or debit note relates to that supply, that principal shall not also issue, as the case may
be, a tax invoice or a credit note or a debit note.
12 See the discussion at in Richard T. Ainsworth, Data First – Tax Next: How Fiji’s Technology Can Improve New
Zealand’s “Netflix Tax” (Part 2) 94 TAX NOTES INTERNATIONAL 319, 328 (April 18, 2019).
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Figure 1: NZ GSTA §60(1AB)
agreement with a Dependent Agent
New Zealand
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Figure 1 assumes a UK insurance company offers property insurance in New Zealand
through its dependent resident agent. The agent secures six clients, three individuals (#1, #2, and
#3) and three businesses (A, B, and C). Each of the businesses are GST registered. Figure 1 also
assumes that the UK principal and the NZ dependent agent enter into a §60(1AB) agreement
with respect to individuals #1 and #2, and with respect to businesses A, and B. As a result, the
dependent resident agent will issue tax invoices to these four clients “as if” it was making the
taxable supply (even though, contractually, it is the principal who is, in fact, making the supply).
As a normal domestic transaction, 15% GST will be added to the invoices to #1, #2, A,
and B. The resident dependent agent will collect, report and remit the GST. This is not the case
with individual #3 and business C. A 15% GST will be collected from individual #3, but it will
be by the UK Insurance Company under §8(3)(c). This is the main Netflix Tax rule. 13 This is
See the discussion at Figure 2 in Richard T. Ainsworth, Data First – Tax Next: How Fiji’s Technology Can
Improve New Zealand’s “Netflix Tax” (Part 1) 94 TAX NOTES INTERNATIONAL 159, 168-170 (April 8, 2019).
13
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assuming that the UK principal exceeds the NZ$60,000 threshold, and has not “tax planned”
around it (using the §60(1AB) agreement with #1, #2, businesses A and B to minimize its New
Zealand sales and stay under the threshold.) The same ambiguity applies in the case of business
C’s invoice. Will it include GST? This transaction could be considered “out of scope” (not
taxable at all), or it could be treated (at the sole discretion of the principal) as a taxable sale that
is subject to GST at 0%. (§11A(1)(x)).14
Different compliance results from what might be considered comparable transactions can
cause confusion, but they are necessary because of the way the Netflix Tax integrates nonresidents into the New Zealand marketplace without including a bias for or against certain
commercial entities. These anti-bias patterns become more complex, when we consider
independent agents that facilitate both domestic and remote service transactions.
The independent agent statutory design replicates the treatment of electronic
marketplaces. Figure 2 (below) shows multiple insurance companies using an independent agent
as a domestic platform for selling policies to New Zealand residents. The taxability of the
insurance transactions varies from principal to principal. In some instances, the “underlying
supplier” (the principal) will be the taxpayer, while in others the “marketplace” (the independent
agent) will be the taxpayer.
There is a strong echo of the electronic marketplace rules in the independent resident
agent rules. The operative presumptions are set inversely. Electronic marketplaces are
presumed to be the taxpayer, unless they fulfil requirements to “opt-out,” which make the
underlying supplier the taxpayer. In the domestic agent patterns, it is the non-resident principal
that is deemed to be the taxpay unless the parties enter into a §60(1AB) agreement which will
make the domestic agent the taxpayer. (These provisions operate as mirror images of each
other). See figure 2 (below).

See Figure 2 and the discussion of the §11A(1)(j) exception to the zero-rating provision of §11A(1) in Richard T.
Ainsworth, Data First – Tax Next: How Fiji’s Technology Can Improve New Zealand’s “Netflix Tax,” (Part 1), 94
TAX NOTES INTERNATIONAL 159, 169 - 171 (April 8, 2019).
14
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Figure 2: NZ GSTA §60(1AB) agreement with an Independent Agent
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In this example a single independent agent stands between eighteen New Zealand buyers
(9 businesses and 9 consumers) and three insurance companies (2 domestic and 1 foreign). The
independent agent functions like an internet platform, offering New Zealand resident customers a
range of insurance principals, some of whom offer this service with GST, and some of whom
offer it without GST. When tax is imposed, it is at 15%, or 0%.
If there is a chance for error in this fact pattern, it will most likely arise from an
independent agent mistakenly charging GST when the principal is charging GST at a zero rate
under §11A(1)(x), or where the transaction is deemed not to be subject to GST under §8(4D).
Correcting errors becomes complicated if the amount of the transaction exceeds NZ$1,000. In
this instance, the Netflix Tax requires the buyer to secure a refund directly from the seller
§20(4C). The buyer is not allowed to take a deduction for GST actually (but erroneously) paid
over to the seller, even if this amount has been further remitted to the tax authority (§25(1)).
Perhaps the most troubling part of this is that the financial burden of double taxation is on
New Zealand resident buyers, and this group is the least likely of all the parties to have any kind
of notification that errors have been committed. The IRD will find errors on audit. There is a
better way with fiscal invoices.
If everyone selling in and into the New Zealand market was required to issue a fiscal
invoice, a lot of the problems would be solved. Fiscal invoices provide a real-time notification
mechanism. As discussed in Part 2, 15 fiscal invoices, like those in the Fiji VMS, provide very
See the discussion at Figure 1 in Richard T. Ainsworth, Data First – Tax Next: How Fiji’s Technology Can
Improve New Zealand’s “Netflix Tax” (Part 2) 94 TAX NOTES INTERNATIONAL 319, 328-30 (April 18, 2019).
15
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effective notice. If business C, or business F received an invoice from the Independent Agent
that included 15% GST, as well as or instead of an invoice by the appropriate principal (either at
15% or 0%), then they could immediately notify the tax authority of the error by scanning the
QR code. The Tax Core would see the double/ erroneous invoicing and respond. The whole
process should be automated.
Even better, a customer service notification (text message) could be self-initiated by the
Tax Core when AI scanned the database looking for errors. The buyer would be automatically
alerted. The Tax Core could direct the buyer to refund solutions, and notify the other parties that
an error was detected and an update was most likely needed in the invoice generating system.
FALSE INFORMATION
One of the underlying concerns with the Netflix Tax is that individuals in New Zealand
are accustomed to making GST-free purchases of services from online vendors. The Netflix
Tax is designed to change this; to level the playing field with domestic suppliers. But, this “level
playing field” argument may not be able to change attitudes. People can be expected to try to
find a way around the new rules.
In response, new penalties have been added. The penalties are discretionary, and operate
as a reverse charge. Application is by Commissioner’s discretion. §5(27) indicates that, “The
Commissioner may treat a person resident in New Zealand who receives a supply of remote
services to which section 8(3)(c) applies as if they were making a supply of services that is
chargeable with tax ...” (emphasis added).
The enforcement mechanism has a gentle touch. The Commissioner’s discretion is
limited to situations “... where the act of the person ... is a repeated occurrence ... [or] ... the
amount of tax ... is substantial.”16
However, the penalties can be serious. In addition to the reverse charge which is
specifically authorized, the existing “knowledge offences” also apply when a person deliberately
supplies incorrect information for the purpose of avoiding GST. The two main places this
would happen are (a) a misrepresentation that a consumer is a registered business or (b) a
misrepresentation that a consumer is as a resident of another country.17 This is a criminal
penalty and a person convicted of a knowledge offence is liable for a fine of up to NZ$25,000 for
a first-time offence or NZ$50,000 for repeated offences.18 The problem with enforcement is not
the ‘gentle touch,” or the threat of serious “knowledge offence” penalties; the problem is
identifying false information occurrences.
NZ GST §§ 5(27)(c)(i) & (ii).
NZ TAX ADMINISTRATION ACT §143A(g):
in relation to a recipient of a supply of remote services from a non-resident supplier, and for the
purposes of avoiding the payment of goods and services tax, knowingly provides altered, false, or
misleading information relating to their residence in New Zealand or their status as a registered
person.
18 New Zealand Inland Revenue, Policy and Strategy, Special Report: GST on Cross-border Supplies of Remote
Services (May, 2016) at 30, available at: https://taxpolicy.ird.govt.nz/sites/default/files/2016-sr-gst-cross-bordersupplies.pdf
16
17
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These papers have considered intentional misrepresentations of residence and status.
The proposal is to adopt Fiji’s VAT Monitoring System (VMS), and through it develop a
scannable database that will point to misrepresentation incidents. The VMS uses a system of
fiscal invoices, which works well for domestic transactions, and which needs to be
complimented with a robust, cross-border information exchange in the case of complex
international transactions. This information exchange is a challenge that New Zealand cannot
meet on its own.
Two examples can be drawn from earlier materials illustrating status misrepresentation
and residence misrepresentation. The first, a status misrepresentation borrows from figure 1
(above) involves dependent domestic agents (see figure 3 below). The second, a residence
misrepresentation borrows from figure 7 in part 3, and involves the downstream frauds spawned
by electronic marketplaces (see figure 4 below).
Status misrepresentation. Figure 1 (above) illustrated a dependent domestic agent which
secured six clients for its foreign principal. For example, a UK property and casualty insurance
company can be offering accident coverage for business and personal automobiles. Figure 1
assumes that a §60(1AB) agreement is entered into for two individual consumers (#1 and #2) and
two business purchasers (businesses A and B). The agreement makes the dependent agent
responsible for issuing invoices, collecting, and remitting the GST “as if” it was making the
taxable supply to these buyers. The UK Insurance Company remains responsible for invoicing
consumer #3 (which is subject to the 15% GST) and company C (which is either not subject to
GST under §8(4D) or taxable at a zero-rate under §11A(1)(x)).
If we further assume that consumer #3 (falsely) represents himself as a registered
business to the UK Insurance Company, the invoice he receives will likely be zero-rated
(erroneously). How would the IRD know? Consumer #3 is unlikely to volunteer this
information, and the remoteness of the UK Insurance Company makes it unlikely that it would
be able to identify the error.
Figure 3 (below) modifies figure 1 to diagram the basic dynamics of VMS adoption: the
presence of a Tax Core in the tax authority, the transmission of transaction data to the Tax Core,
and the return of the fiscal invoice to the taxpayer.

9
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3581460

Figure 3: (Replicating & Supplementing Figure 1 above) Dependent Agent & Tax Core with a §60(1AB) agreement
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The simple mandate of the VMS is that every invoice issued to a resident consumer must
be fiscalized. This would go a long way in helping the tax authority identify misrepresentations.
Under the Fiji rules, transaction data is first sent to the tax authority, it is checked and verified by
the Secure Element in the Tax Core, signed and returned to the supplier (with a QR code). This
data, along with the QR code will become the fiscal receipt given to the buyer.
Because the Tax Core now has a digital copy of the invoice issued to the customer who
supplied false information, along with every other invoice issued by the UK principal to local
residents (as well as invoices issued through the Dependent Agent), the tax authority can risk
analyze all the New Zealand insurance contracts for consistency. If New Zealand adopted the
VMS it would most likely requiring the §60(1AB) agreement to be transmitted to the Tax Core,
where it would be associated with all relevant invoices. A remote audit of the UK Insurance
company could be conducted. All the invoices and the §60(1AB) agreement would be in hand.
If the Commissioner sought to penalize consumer #3 for his misrepresentation she might
start with an automated message appraising the consumer (as well as the New Zealand agent and
UK principal) that a correction was in order. This could be done in real-time with a high-quality
AI program.
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Residence misrepresentation. Figure 7 in part 3 contained two examples of residence
misrepresentation. In the first, a UK resident represents himself as a Bahraini, who is not subject
VAT in Bahrain, and by doing so avoids a 20% UK VAT on a remote service purchase. In the
second, an individual from New Zealand, represents himself as a resident of Fiji, thereby
avoiding a 15% GST, although incurring a 9% VAT instead.
Figure 7 is drafted under the assumption that there is a fully functional international
system of fiscal invoices modeled on the Fiji VMS, and that the fiscal data gathered on the
invoices is shared. In addition, it is also assumed that a macro set of data counters (agreed to
among the countries and coordinated by the common Tax Core) are reflected on each of the
fiscal invoices. These counters are separate and apart from the counters used within each
jurisdiction that would form mini-blockchains of data from each POS. Figure 3 replicates the
figure 7 diagram from part 3:
Figure 4 (Replicating Figure 7 from Part 3)
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Because Fiji, New Zealand and the United Kingdom share a common cloud-based Tax
Core, and because each jurisdiction sends to the cloud the encrypted fiscal invoices generated by
the electronic marketplace, the counters produce a meta-blockchain reflective of the activity of
the electronic marketplace in Fiji, the UK and New Zealand. Two residence manipulations, one
on the sixth invoice and the other on the fifth highlight how false information is easier to detect
with the VMS.
It is anticipated that because audits of residence determination are ultimately an audit of
the global tax determination programming of the electronic marketplace, that these audits will be
best conducted jointly by the impacted jurisdictions. The blockchained meta-data of the joint
Tax Core will form the basis of the audit.
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The sixth invoice records a sale to a New Zealand consumer, but the tax algorithm
deployed by the electronic marketplace determines a residence in Fiji. The individual’s home is
in New Zealand, but his purchases obscure this fact. This makes the error seem intentional, and
the customer pays 9% VAT rather than 15% GST. Fiji’s VAT residence rules are reasonably
easy to coopt if someone files a personal income tax return there, and this consumer does.19
Further investigation reveals that there seems to be a deliberate effort to confuse the tax
determination algorithm. The consumer uses an Australian cell phone, and makes purchases
with Australian credit cards issued by Fiji branches of Australian banks. This particular supply
is purchased from an Australian underlying supplier with a price denominated in Australian
dollars.
The electronic marketplace may not be entirely to blame for the mistake here, but with a
real-time exchange of invoice data among New Zealand, Fiji and the UK, the IRD has access to
the residence determination on the sixth invoice. With fiscal invoices that are shared among the
tax authorities, this manipulation could be uncovered. Without it, discovery would be nearly
impossible.
The fifth invoice, where a UK resident represents himself as Bahraini would most likely
come under scrutiny because of the size of the purchase (20,000 Bahraini Dinars). Because
Bahrain is not part of the common Tax Core this invoice would not be subject to fiscalization,
and would not be automatically shared among the Fiji, UK and New Zealand tax authorities.
However, the tax determining algorithm in the electronic marketplace would retain digital traces
of the data presented by the consumer and the decision process applied by the AI. Because the
electronic marketplace is deemed to be the taxpayer, and because it has substantial activity in
Fiji, UK and New Zealand it would have to respond to audit inquiries about the fifth invoice.
False information can easily disrupt algorithm-based electronic marketplaces. It is
difficult for any single jurisdiction to locate these deliberate frauds, largely because the data
needed to do so is either in the non-resident electronic marketplace, or with the customer. What
the VMS does is preserve a verifiable copy of each invoice generated by the Tax Core in a
common cloud as well as the systems of the resident jurisdiction. In most cases this will be
sufficient for an audit, but in extreme cases an inquiry may need to be made of the electronic
marketplace’s programming itself.
DOMESTIC DUAL STATUS TAXPAYERS

Fiji VATA Decree 1991, §2:
Resident means resident as defined in Section 2 of the Income Tax Act 1974;
Laws of Fiji, Chapter 201, Income Tax Act, §2:
Resident" means(a) a person, other than a company, who resides in Fiji, and includes a person(i) whose domicile is in Fiji, unless the Commissioner is satisfied that his permanent place of abode
is outside Fiji;
(ii) who has actually been in Fiji, continuously or intermittently, during more than one-half of the
income year, unless the Commissioner is satisfied that his usual place of abode is outside
Fiji and that he does not intend to take up residence in Fiji. (emphasis added)
19
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The final Netflix Tax provisions considered in these papers concern residents who have a
dual tax status – that is, the New Zealand resident purchasing remotely supplied services can
properly represent themselves to the seller as a business or as a consumer. If the initial purchase
is made as a business, but is later transitioned (in part or in whole) to personal use the self-supply
(reverse charge) rules come into play.
There is some considerable amount of complexity here as both the reverse charge rules
and the Netflix Tax were major statutory responses to technological advances, and the use of the
internet as a medium for making supplies. In both cases, cross-border services were the problem.
The reverse charge rules took effect in 2005, and the Netflix Tax in 2016.
But there is more. Because the reverse charge rules tended to consider events as
transactionally-static, rather than dynamic, New Zealand followed the reverse charge rules with
provisions that dealt with change of use, effective April 1, 2011.20 The change of use rules deal
with post-purchase decisions by a resident to actually use a supply in a different manner than
what was apparent at the time of acquisition. For example, a business purchase of software that
over time is dedicated to personal use.
Thus, to get a full picture of this area it is necessary to consider a range of often
overlapping provisions: (a) reverse charge rules, (b) change of use provisions, and (c) the Netflix
Tax. In outline form the range of tax outcomes are:
• If a New Zealand resident buyer says nothing about his tax status to a remote supplier of
services, the statute requires the seller to treat the buyer as a consumer.21 Saying
“nothing” does inject some factual ambiguity into the acquisition. The statute resolves
this ambiguity against the domestic purchaser (initially). In this case, the main Netflix
Tax rule of §8(3)(c) applies. It requires GST to be imposed at 15%, and requires the
seller to collect, report, and remit it. Assuming, of course, that the services are not
physically performed outside of New Zealand. 22
• However, if the New Zealand resident buyer indicates that it is a business, then preNetflix Tax rules would have considered these remote services to be supplied outside of
New Zealand.23 The non-resident supplier would not be required to collect GST. A
reverse charge by the resident buyer was applicable. Three conditions needed to be met:
o services were supplied by a non-resident to a resident; and
o the percentage of actual or expected use of the services (for the purpose of
carrying out the taxable activity of the buyer) would be less than 95%; and

Part of the difficulty with the change of use rules is that they consider the use in terms of a wasting asset, and
allow related input tax credit claims over time, and not immediately upon change of use. Under pre-April 1, 2011
rules a customer would claim all relevant input tax in the GST return period that covered the change date. The
design is to “...apportion input tax deductions in line with the actual use of the goods and services.” New Zealand
Inland Revenue announcement, GST Adjustments from 1 April, 2011, available at
https://www.classic.ird.govt.nz/gst/additional-calcs/change-adjust/change-adjust-index.html
21 NZ GST §8B(5).
22 NZ GST §11A(1)(j) zero-rates services physically performed outside of New Zealand that are also not remote
services supplied to a New Zealand person who is not a registered taxpayer.
23 NZ GST §8(2).
20
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•

o the supply would be a taxable supply if made by a New Zealand registered person
in the course of their business.24
This rule introduces several ambiguous elements into the current statute: (a) the dual
standards of actual or expected use, measuring (b) whether or not 95% business use was
achieved, and (c) the complication of what to do if the buyer did not meet the 95%
threshold.
Even if the above conditions were met, the supplier could still unilaterally elect to treat
the supply as one that was made in New Zealand.25 If the supplier did so, GST would
apply. The supplier would be required to register (if sales exceeded the NZ$60,000
registration threshold). However, the applicable rate would be 0%.26 GST would be
remitted by the buyer under the reverse charge mechanism. 27 Input tax deductions would
be allowed.28

NZ GST §8(4B) imposes a reverse charge when supplies are treated as supplied inside
New Zealand (not if they were considered supplied outside of New Zealand). This limitation on
the reverse charge presented problems for remotely supplied services under §8(3)(c) when (under
the general rule) those services were deemed to be supplied outside of New Zealand.
To solve this problem NZ GST §20(4D) was added to the Netflix Tax rules. This section
modifies another new rule that prohibits input tax deductions, §20(4C), for §8(3)(c) remote
services unless the recipient has a tax invoice issued under §24(5B), dealing with transactions
where GST was incorrectly applied. §20(4D) allows any recipient of remote services who is
required to remit output tax through a reverse charge to claim an input tax deduction to the extent
the services are used for making taxable supplies.
Consider Figure 5 (below). A New Zealand sole proprietor orders a software package
from a UK remote supplier. Given the nature of the software, the order could be for business
use, or it could just as easily be for personal use. The buyer declares that the supply is to carry
on the business. As a result, the UK supplier does not collect GST, and does not issue a New
Zealand tax invoice. The UK VAT is fully refunded to the supplier.
This result is fully consistent with pre-Netflix Tax results under §8(4), but it is achieved
for §8(3)(c) transactions through §8(4D). In addition, because the supply is (a) deemed not to be
made in New Zealand, and (b) at acquisition (or after an adjustment period) the percentage of
intended use or the percentage of actual use of the services for taxable purposes was less than
NZ GST §8(4B)
NZ GST §8(4D).
26 NZ GST §11A(1)(x). The zero rate returned no revenue to the government, but did allow the non-resident
supplier to file a return and secure GST refunds for New Zealand input tax paid.
27 NZ GST §8(4B). For a discussion of this statutory change (compared with the reverse charge provision in Fiji)
see, Richard T. Ainsworth, Data First – Tax Next: How Fiji’s Technology Can Improve New Zealand’s “Netflix
Tax,” (Part 1), 94 TAX NOTES INTERNATIONAL 159, 169 - 171 (April 8, 2019). See also Policy Advice
Division of the Inland Revenue Department, GST Guidelines for Recipients of Imported Services (October 2004)
available at: https://taxpolicy.ird.govt.nz/sites/default/files/2004-other-gst-guidelines-imported-services.pdf
28 NZ GST §20(4D) is a new section that avoids the prohibition on input tax deductions by recipients of remote
services if the resident is required to return an output tax under the reverse charge provisions. NZ GST §20(4C).
An input tax deduction is allowed to the extent to which the services are used in making taxable supplies.
24
25
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95%, a reverse charge is required. That is, the resident buyer is treated as making the full supply
to itself, and thereby returns an output tax of $60 (15% x $400 = $60). Then, after an adjustment
period, if it is determined that the New Zealand proprietor actually used the software package for
personal purposes for about 50% of the time, and for the other 50% of the time used it for
purposes of carrying on the registered business, a deemed sale is necessary. Thus, a second step
is required. The resident (as a business consumer) will be deemed to sell 50% of the remote
services to himself (as an individual consumer). This sale will produce an input tax deduction of
$30 (15% x $200 = $30).
Figure 5:
Reverse Charge – buyer’s statement – I am “GST Registered & using services for taxable supplies”
Formerly §8(4) controls area –
b/c sale is to GST reg. business to
“carry on” the supply = out of NZ
& is not taxable. Same result w/
§8(3)(c) “remote services” & 8(4D)
50/50 use

$0

NZ
Tax
Admin

Resident
Self-employed
Business

New Zealand

Other Jurisdiction (UK)

Declare as a NZ registered person
Payment without GST (NZ$400)
Software package

R/C

NonResident
Supplier

Buyer of remote service under NZ GST§8(3)(c)
must R/C under NZ GST §8(4B) if services
(a) not in NZ, and if (b) less than 95% taxable

$60

Looks like standard
B2B export to
anther jurisdiction
Collect no NZ GST
Per NZ GST §8(4D)
Issue No NZ tax invoice
Refunded all UK VAT

Intended or actual use rule
actual use given = 50%

Resident’s
Business

The full amount (NZ$400)
is subject to R/C thus NZ$60
Sale of 50% to self, Resident

<$30>
Resident’s
Business

input credit of $30

individual

Normal rule §20(4D) – §8(3)(c) recipients - no input credit
Except tax invoice under §24(5B)
Except §20(4D) – R/C recipients of §8(3)(c) under §5B
Thus, credit <NZ$30>

Although these transactions will most likely be offset against one another on a single
return, they should be separately analyzed as a $0, $60, and <$30> GST remittance/ refund. The
net position is $30.
If there is a problem with Figure 5 it is that the fact pattern is exceedingly difficult to
audit. The IRD is not forewarned that a particular New Zealand resident is engaged in a remote
service transaction, or that a particular UK supplier is significantly engaged in making remote
sales of services into the New Zealand marketplace. The UK supplier collects no GST, files no
returns, and remit no revenue. The IRD could initiate one-by-one domestic audits of purchasers,
but nothing in the New Zealand GST extends enforcement authority overseas, and that is where
the data is that the IRD really needs in order to effectively audits these offshore transactions.
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Figure 6 (below) presents essentially the same fact pattern and tax outcome, but it is
structured around a different set of provisions in the New Zealand law. New Zealand recognizes
that many remote suppliers pay GST when making domestic supplies, and are unable to deduct
these amounts because they are not making taxable supplies. NZ GST§8(4D) changes this by
providing remote suppliers an option, exercised unilaterally, to treat sales (like those in Figure 6)
as domestic supplies that would be zero-rated under §11A(1)(x). Importantly, the “sticker price”
on the remote supply would not change between Figure 5 and 6, just the ability to claim credit
for taxes paid.
Figure 6 largely follows Figure 5. A UK remote service supplier sells a software package
to a New Zealand resident sole proprietor. The price is the same, NZ$400, and the software can
easily be used for business or personal consumption. The supplier is told that the buyer is a
registered New Zealand business, but rather than completing the transaction “as is” where the
supply will be deemed to be performed outside of New Zealand, the supplier elects under §8(4D)
to treat the remotely supplied service as a supply made in New Zealand. The service will be
zero-rated under §11A(1)(x).
This purchase is not subject to the reverse charge rules under §8(4B), because those
provisions only apply to transactions deemed to be made outside of New Zealand. However, as
in Figure 5, the New Zealand resident business owner splits the use of the software 50/50
between onward business sales and personal consumption. As a result, the Netflix Tax provision
§20(3JC) applies. It requires the resident buyer to return the same output tax ($30) as in Figure
5. The output tax is imposed directly on the nominal GST component in any non-taxable use of
the services. In this case the non-taxable use is at 50% ($60 x 50% = $30). §20(3JC), like
§8(4D) in Figure 5, is applied contingently as the taxable use must be less than 95% of all use.
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Figure 6:
No Reverse Charge – Supplier Elects “NZ supply”
New Zealand

Payment without GST (NZ$400)

50/50 use

$0

Software package
§8(4D) - Supplier elects “NZ Supply.” Zero-rate.

Resident
Self-employed
Business

X

NZ
Tax
Admin

Other Jurisdiction (UK)

Resident’s
Business

Use of software
In onward
Business sale
Price + GST
No related input
deduction

Non-business use
Personal use

$30
Resident
Individual

YES

Other NZ
Business

50%

NonResident
Supplier

Looks like
B2B (export) to
Other jurisdiction.
Elect zero-rate,
Collect no NZ GST
11A(1)(x) allows
input deduction

if
Taxable
use
Less
Than
95%

50%
§20(3JC)
Return as output tax
nominal GST part
of non-taxable use
$400x15%x50%=30

No R/C
Only if supply NOT
made in NZ will R/C
in §8(4B) apply

The important difference between Figures 5 and 6 is not the net GST remitted (that
amount is the same in both examples), it is the leverage that the IRD has over non-resident
supplier data in Figure 6 that it does not have in Figure 5. In Figure 6 the remote supplier issues
tax invoices, and submits GST returns. He elects to do so because he wants the ability to file
New Zealand returns claiming GST credits. There is critical audit data in these filings (most
notably in the tax invoices). These filings aggregate remote service supply chains. They detail
who is purchasing, and who is providing services to New Zealand customers. There is nothing
comparable in Figure 5.
The fundamental difficulty here is that in New Zealand the Figure 6 scenario is voluntary.
The data the IRD gets is only from some of the many non-resident suppliers of remote services
selling into the New Zealand market. There is a very good chance that revenue shortfalls do not
lie among the volunteers.
To effective supervise this market segment (and by extension to effectively oversee all
GST compliance in a modern economy), New Zealand needs to adopt technology, like that in
Fiji, which will allow comprehensive transactional oversight. Use of secure technological
invoice interfaces (a) with the government and (b) among taxpayers should be mandatory. It is
not expensive. It is not complicated. But it must be comprehensive. No more data will be sent
and compiled than what is expected to be provided on a tax return, or between an arm’s length
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buyer and seller. But the data must be available in real-time, not in one or three month delayedtime. Tax-time needs to be real-time.
Throughout these papers it has been very apparent that a number of Netflix Tax
provisions (not the least of which are those dealing with electronic marketplaces) have been
drafted to deal with the compliance problems that are created when a residence-based system
tries to deal with remote, internet-savvy, global supply chains seeking to exploit the New
Zealand market. Often the GST is the profit margin for fraudsters. It is difficult to enforce
compliance when a residence-based consumption tax intersects with non-resident, digital
suppliers. Statutory designs endeavoring to do so can become exceedingly complex and
counterintuitive.
New Zealand has not ventured deeply into the kinds of technology-based compliance
measures that would resolve these problems. It would benefit from doing so. New Zealand
needs to consider using code (computer code) to regulate in the same manner that Fiji does. One
final example brings home the technology point being made.
Figure 7 (below) extends Figures 5 and 6 by hypothesizing a simple compliance error.
Figure 7 is borrowed in whole cloth from Example 3 in the IRD’s Policy and Strategy, Special
Report: GST on Cross-border Supplies. of Remote Services (May, 2016).29
This is not tax fraud. It is a compliance error that the Netflix Tax drafters expect will be
somewhat common, given the number of remedial provisions that are used to deal with it. It is
the kind of error that frustrates taxpayers and absorbs enforcement resources that are better
allocated elsewhere.
In Figure 7 the remote service supplier (UK) sells a software package to a New Zealand
resident sole proprietor (just as before). The software can be used either for business or personal
consumption, and this buyer uses the software in both capacities. The supplier is told that the
buyer is a registered New Zealand business (although we suspect that the seller has not heard
what the buyer has told him).
A simple (invoice-based) mistake is made. We are not told why the mistake was made.
Perhaps the mistake is made because this transaction occurs very fast, and is entirely online?
Then again, perhaps it is the sellers automated point of sale (POS) system, and its invoice
generating app that makes the mistake (and does it repeatedly)? Perhaps the POS system is not
fully up to date with New Zealand’s invoicing conventions? We do not know, but in this
environment, it is likely the error is technology driven.
The Special Report’s Example 3 does not specify how common the IRD feels this kind of
double taxation will be. The only reference is the following: “... there may be instances when a
GST-registered recipient applies the reverse charge and the non-resident supplier also
inadvertently charges the GST-registered recipient GST.” (emphasis added)30

29
30

Supra note 18 at 8.
Id., at 15.
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With a little imagination we might say there could be many instances. Scenarios are not
difficult to imagine. The error-dynamics are the result of Netflix Tax provisions that link
taxpayer status to non-actions during sales transactions. Not performing, not receiving, or not
recognizing the performance of a required action is what triggers the double tax.
A supplier will tax (tax #1) if it is not notified of the buyer’s business status, and a buyer
will tax (tax #2) if it is not notified that the supplier has already taxed. This is a formula for taxdisaster.
• Supplier’s tax. The most common event where a non-resident supplier of remote services
is expected to collect and remit GST is on a sale to a New Zealand (resident) final
consumer. This is the main Netflix Tax rule at §8(3)(c).
o Non-action. A non-resident remote service supplier is required to treat their
services as supplied to a final consumer (who is not GST registered) unless the
recipient notifies the supplier that it is a registered business, §8B(5). Nonnotification attracts the GST.
• Buyer’s tax. The most common event where a buyer is expected to perform a reverse
charge (impose the GST on itself), is when a sale is made to a registered business. In a
business-to-business supply, the non-resident supplier is required not to tax, §8(4D), and
the business buyer is required to reverse charge §8(4B).
o Non-action. Effectively, a resident buyer receives notice that it must perform a
reverse charge when it does not receive an invoice that states that a 15% GST has
been imposed. This is the standard result in a business-to-business supply of
remote services, because the service is deemed to be supplied outside of New
Zealand.31
• Figures 5, 6, and 7 are intentionally designed to create the possibility of a double tax
event. The buyer is expressly identified as a proprietorship where the same purchase can
and is used in a personal and in a business capacity.
Thus, if a seller taxes, but does not announce the taxation event to a business-buyer who
does not immediately check behind the invoice to see if GST was actually applied, double
taxation is likely under the Netflix Tax. The standard vehicle for communication between
buyers and sellers is the invoice. The line item we are looking for recites the GST. This is a
standard requirement on a tax invoice. However, §24(5)(b) makes it clear that non-resident
suppliers of remote services are not required to issue a tax invoice.32
This is a formula for disaster. It makes good sense to have these rules if you know that a
particular buyer can only be a consumer, but it is not so good if consumer status is a fall-back
position for buyers who fail to provide adequate notice of business status, §8B(5).

A buyer is also notified that it needs to perform a reverse charge when it receives an invoice indicating that the
seller has elected to treat the sale as occurring within New Zealand and has imposed a zero-rate on the invoice,
§11A(1)(x).
32 §24(5)(b) states:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this Act, a supplier is not required to provide a tax invoice
if— ... (b) the supplier is a non-resident supplier of remote services to which section 8(3)(c) applies.
31
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In Figure 7 (below) the invoice issued by the non-resident supplier is for NZ$400. This
is not a tax invoice, nor does it have to be. It does not mention GST, but the 15% GST is
included in the price. The true cost of the software is $347.83. The GST is $52.17. ($347.83 +
$52.17 = $400). The unanswered questions are:
• Why did this happen? Somehow, the non-resident supplier was not adequately informed
that the buyer was a registered business. Thus, it (properly) treated the sale as a
consumer sale.
• Why was the notification insufficient? Notification procedures are not standardized
within the global non-resident remote service provider community. If notification was
sent, it was not treated as adequate. The reasons for inadequacy are possibly endless, and
may have to do with the systems in place. In a market segment entirely comprised of
non-resident remote service providers, this is very likely a technological issue. If it is a
technological issue that goes undetected and uncorrected the double tax goes on forever
tilting the playing field against remote service providers.
• Why wasn’t the error spotted by the buyer? Buyer-notification is invoice-based, and the
non-resident seller is not required to issue a tax invoice. To identify the GST embedded
in the price the buyer would have to analyze data not necessarily broken out on the
invoice. This is an unlikely occurrence in a fast-paced internet-based market.
• Is there a fraud permutation (not just a mistake) in this fact pattern? Yes. This scenario
is a common GST/VAT fraud. If the non-resident supplier does not file a return, does not
remit the GST collected, and becomes a missing trader, fraud would be very difficult to
uncover on audit. It would only be apparent to the IRD after many resident businesses
attempt to secure a refund of the double tax, and someone in the IRD identifies the error
pattern. Most likely, the attempt to collect from the non-resident supplier will be
defeated by his early “disappearance” from the internet.
Getting the tax right after a New Zealand double tax event is a multi-step procedure. In
the diagram below, the box on the left records the six transactions with the Treasury that are
needed to resolve the problem. The first two entries occur immediately (they are the double tax
event), the next four occur after the buyer recognizes that he has paid GST twice on the same
transaction.
• The first record is for $52.17. This is the amount of GST embedded in the invoice the
buyer received from the seller. The base amount (the true cost of the services) is
$347.83. The GST calculation is $347.83 x 15% = $52.17.
• The second record is for $60. This is the GST calculated by the buyer through its reverse
charge. Because the buyer mistakes $400 for the true price, $347.83, the reverse charge
calculation is $400 x 15% = $60. This amount is not only wrong, it is too high.
• The third record is for <$7.83>. This is an adjustment allowed by §25AA(3)(a). It is a
correction for an incorrect calculation of input tax related to the reverse charge where the
wrong tax base was used ($400 instead of $347.83).
• The fourth record is for <$52.17>. The Netflix Tax requires that buyer make a direct
request of the seller to get the GST back, §20(4C). In instances where the invoice is less
than $1,000 sellers are allowed to make the adjustment by issuing a corrected invoice.
This special rule is applied in Figure 7 (§24(4)).
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•
•

The fifth record is for <$30>. This is the GST input calculation accounting for the 50%
personal (consumer) use of the software. This calculation is in error, because it is relying
on the same $400 base price and the $60 GST reverse charge.
The sixth record is for $3.91. This is an adjustment allowed by §25AA(2)(b). It is a
correction for an incorrect calculation of output tax related to the re-sale of the software
from business to personal use. It is a companion provision to the adjustment in the third
record, but the adjustment is going in a different direction and relies on a different
statutory provision.

Figure 7:
Reverse Charge; Double Tax & Less than NZ$1,000 Invoice
(a) Error charging GST; (b) dual business/ personal use; (c) error correction with invoice b/c < NZ$1,000
Problem: Unknown
embedded GST in payment

Assumes No GST Paid
w/ Invoice

50/50 use
Resident
Self-employed
Business

<$52.17>

ERROR: Invoice states no GST – Price = NZ$400 includes GST
Declared - NZ registered person
Deliver Software package

R/C

$60
<$7.83>

$347.83 + $52.17 = $400
NZ$400 x 3/23 = NZ$52.17

NZ
Tax
Admin

$52.17

Assumes GST Charged
on Invoice

Adjustment
§25AA(3)(a)

R/C likely
too high s/b
based on
347.83
Not 400
Error 7.83

Request GST refund – NZ$52.17

Resident’s
Business

NonResident
Supplier

Looks like
B2B (export) to
Other jurisdiction
Collect no UK VAT
Collects, reports & remits
NZ GST

NonResident
Supplier

Off-setting
Output Tax
No refund, invoice instead, b/c < NZ$1,000
§24(4)
Sale of 50%
to self,

<$30>
Resident’s
Business

$3.91

Output tax
of $30

Corrections needed
(1) Invoice of NZ$400 is too high, s/b NZ$347.17
(2) R/C of NZ$60 is too high, s/b NZ$52.17
(3) 50% self-supply is too high, s/b NZ$26.09

Resident
Individual

Adjustment
§25AA(2)(b)

New Zealand

Other Jurisdiction (UK)

FIJI’S TECHNOLOGY SOLUTION:
THE VAT MONITORING SYSTEM (VMS)
Throughout these papers New Zealand’s traditional statute and regulation approach to the
problem of non-resident remote service suppliers has been contrasted with the technology
intensive reform model developed in Fiji, the VMS. New Zealand’s residence-based GST has
visible difficulties trying to regulate this market segment with the standard approaches to tax
reform. New Zealand works well with the data that it has from residential sources, but it simply
does not have what it needs to do the job, and what it does have is not available in real-time. In
some instances, reasonably complex rules have been crafted to secure more information. But it
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is clear that something more, something different, something slightly more radical, and very realtime is needed to come to grips with managing compliance with technology-facilitated sales.
In the immediately prior example, how much easier would it be for buyer, seller, and the
IRD if a simple rule required that all sales into New Zealand (in order to be enforceable at law) 33
needed to be accompanied by a fiscal invoice that would itemize the purchased supplies, prices
charged, and GST amounts due on each transaction. The rule would be self-enforcing. No buyer
would buy without receiving a fiscal invoice; no seller should want to sell without one.
Everyone would know that transaction data was sent to the IRD in real-time where it was
checked for completeness and accuracy in the Secure Element, and then signed by the IRD in the
Tax Core before being returned to the seller with a scannable QR code. The QR Code would be
required to be printed on the fiscal invoice. Through the QR code anyone could pull up the
details of the transaction.
In the instance of Figure 7, the buyer would simply scan the QR code on his invoice to
determine if the GST had been imposed by the seller. If the buyer did not check the QR code
and attempted to perform a reverse charge (in error) the transaction data sent to the IRD would
be returned with a notification that the buyer should check the original invoice, as it appeared
that the GST had already been paid. Thus, a single QR Code on a fiscal invoice would eliminate
the need for five “corrective” transactions. There would be no need for a reverse charge, or any
of the adjustments that followed from the initial error of Figure 7.
The best outcome would be if a single QR Core on one transaction would be sufficient to
prompt a seller to re-evaluate its notification system, and make changes so the its automated
system would do a better job picking-up notices that it was selling to New Zealand businesses.
If there is a benign fault in Figure 7, its here. Automated errors are difficult to root out,
particularly if those errors are in non-resident system. Rather than emphasizing penalties for
false information in §5(27), the IRD might re-focus on technology-based penalties. For example,
if the IRD determined, through an IA-based examination of fiscal receipts, that the source of
multiple double-tax events (like that in Example 7) was likely an off-shore programming error,
several automated warning could be followed with financial penalties, leading up to blocking the
seller from the New Zealand internet.
If New Zealand hopes to effectively regulate remote service suppliers, it needs the realtime data that Fiji’s VMS provides. This is a technology-intensive GST area, and it needs to be
met with code-based (computer-code-based) regulation. Fiji shows not only that this works, but
that it costs far less that any traditional (gum-shoe-based) enforcement measure.

In Brazil the digital invoice has been used for securing internal data for cross-border supplies among the twentyseven Brazilian states since 2006. It is part of the Brazilian tax modernization program called the Sistema Publico
de Escrituracao Digital or Public System for Digital Accounting (SPED). Newton Oller de Mello, Eduardo Mario
Dias, Caio Fernando Fontana & Marcelo Alves Fernandez, The Implementation of the Electronic Tax Documents in
Brazil as a Tool to Fight Tax Evasion, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 13TH WORLD SCIENTIFIC AND ENGINEERING ACADEMY
AND SOCIETY (WSEAS) INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON SYSTEMS (2009) 449, 453, available at:
http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=1627575&picked=prox
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